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PUBLIC EMPLOYEE STRIKES IN OHIO:
THE FERGUSON ACT RECONSIDERED
DONALD J. HOFFMAN*
DONALD J. NEWMAN* *
At the present as well as at any other time,
the center of gravity of legal development
lies not in legislation, nor in juristic science,
nor in judicial decision, but in society itself.'
I. INTRODUCTIONA SOCIETY CHANGES through normal evolutionary processes, the laws by
which that society elects to be governed must also be changed.2 The
diminution of the rationale for a given law tends to render that law
vacuous. Impossibility of effective enforcement of the law will often
render a law impotent. Failure by the appropriate legislative body to
revise or repeal such laws to more accurately accommodate the current
consensus results in a general deterioration of society's respect for law.
3
An example is the Ferguson Act, which unequivocably prohibits any
public employee in Ohio from striking.4 It has become clear that the
proscription has lost its legitimacy.
Employment in the public sector has increased quite dramatically
during the past 23 years. In 1947 for example, public employment
constituted 11 per cent of all non-agricultural employment. By 1970, this
proportion had risen to 17 per cent.5 The increase has been considerably
SB.A. Elmhurst College, J.D. Case Western Reserve University.
** A.B. Case Western Reserve University, J.D. Case Western Reserve University.
' Foreword to E. ERLIcl, FUNDA ENIrAL PRINCIPLES oF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
(W. Moll transl. 1936).
2 This assumes a Hobbesian notion of sovereignty. "The obligation of subjects to the
sovereign is understood to last as long and no longer than the power lasts by which
he is able to protect them. For the right men have by nature to protect themselves
when none else can protect them can by no covenant be relinquished." T. HoaBEs,
LEVIATHAN 179 (H. Schneider ed. 1958). In addition, a democratic system of govern-
ment is presupposed whereby once the individual gives up part of his liberty to the
sovereign he may subsequently regain it. As Professor Lon Fuller has stated: "Good
order is law that corresponds to the demands of justice, or morality, or men's notions
of what ought to be." Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law, in SociETY, LAw AND
MoRALTrry 471, 480 (F. Olafson ed. 1961).
3 See Skolnick, Coercion to Virtue: The Enforcement of Morals, 41 S. CAL. L. REv.
588, 624-26 (1968).
4 OHIo REv. CODE. 1 4117.01-.05 (1947).
5 These percentages include both federal and state and local employment and are
based on figures contained in Current Labor Statistics, 94 MONTILY LAD. REv. 95
(Oct. 1971).
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greater at the state and local level as compared to the federal level. During
the same period state and local government employment increased by
274 per cent while the federal government was experiencing a 143 per cent
increase. 6 This increase in the composition of the governmental work
force is related to the population increase that has occurred during those
years. As the population increases, so also does the need for governmental
services.7 There is some indication that the general need for industry will
diminish as we move in ,the direction of a service oriented economy.8
A corollary to the rise in public employment has been the growth
of unionism in this sector. At the state and local level in 1960, public
union membership stood at one million.9 By 1969 that figure had increased
two and one-half times.10 Approximately one-half of -these employees are
teachers, and the next largest group is municipal employees." Studies have
indicated that larger cities tend to have higher percentages of organized
employees. 12 The recen't trend toward official recognitlion of public
employee labor organizations suggests that both the percentages and
gross numbers of organized public employees will continue to rise.13
The rise in public employment and public employee unionism has
been accompanied by an increased militancy among public employees.14
Work stoppages by state and local government employees have risen
from a total of 15 in 1958, to 409 in 1969.15 The interesting aspect
of these figures is that mos-t of these work stoppages were in open
defiance of the laws16 since thirty-eight states have expressly prohibited
6 Id.
7 Cordtz, City Hall Discovers Productivity, FORTUNE, Oct., 1971 at 92.
8See The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), Nov. 25, 1971, § AA, at 2, col. 1.
9 Edwards, Current Developments in Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, in
REFERENCE MANUAL FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAM 11.01 (Ohio Legal
Center Institute ed. Labor, 1971).
10 THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE-LOCAL EMPLOYEE LABOR RELATIONS
2(1970).
11 Id. at 2.
12 INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK 1970, at
392 (1970).
13 Edwards, supra note 9, at 11.01-.02.
14 See Benodin, Increasing Militancy By Public Employees, in 18 PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS LIBRARY 40 (1969); Miller, The Alice-in-Wonderland World of Public
Employee Bargaining, 50 CHI. B. REc. 223, 228 (1969).
15 THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 10, at 3; BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 321, table 148 (1970). In terms of the number of
workers involved, the 15 strikes in 1958 covered 1,720 employees. Id. at 318. The 409
strikes in 1969 involved 159,500 employees. Id. at 321. It might be noted that the
actual work time lost is fairly insignificant when contrasted to the total hours worked.
See Edwards, supra note 9, at 11.12-.13. See also Benodin, supra note 14, at 40.
16 THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 10, at 3.
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strikes by public employees. 17 The impracticality of these no strike
sanctions is readily apparent.
The utter disregard of the law in this area has several explanations.
One is that the public employee has become painfully cognizant of his
counterpart in the private sector who has been given legal protection of
his right to join labor organizations and to withhold his services under
appropriate conditions.' 8 When a situation becomes intolerable, the assault
on human dignity too grievous, an employee's only recourse is to leave
the job.' 9 That the law makes such conduct illegal when engaged in by the
public servant while it permits such conduct for workers in the private
sector only exacerbates public employer-employee disputes.20 Another
factor to be considered is that the penalties for engaging in strikes are
rarely imposed by the public employer. The mightiest weapon in the
public employer's arsenal is the right to discharge employees who strike,
but the obvious impracticality of replacement dictates its infrequent use.
21
Finally, the public employee has learned that through striking he
can be heard.
22
All of the above generalizations concerning public employment
apply with equal force in Ohio. Officially, public employee strikes are
prohibited 'by the Ferguson Act.23 Actually, during 1967 and 1968, Ohio
saw 28 and 24 public employee strikes respectively to rank second
only to Michigan. 24 The tension between law and society is evident.
This article will consider various suggestions that have been made to
facilitate impasse resolution. 25 In addition, four bills pertaining to public
17 Murphy, The State and Local Experience in Employee Relations, in THE CRISIS IN
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE DECADE OF THE SEVENTIES 15, 17 (R. Murphy
& M. Sackman eds. 1970).
18 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1947). See also Zach, Why
Public Employees Strike, 23 ARB. J. (n.s.) 69, 70 (1968).
19ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS PROCEEDINGS 93 (1955-56); Wurf, A Labor
Official Looks at Public Employees, N.Y.U. 21ST LAB. CONF. 523, 534 (1969).
20 Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REv. 931, 936 (1969).
21Note, Teachers' Strikes-A New Militancy, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 367, 382-83
(1968).
2 2 See, e.g., The First Legal Teacher Strike Under Pennsylvania's New Law, 12
MuNICIPAL Arty 29, 30 (1971).
23 OHIO REv. CODE. § 4117.02 provides that: "No public employee shall strike. No
person exercising any authority, supervision, or direction over any public employee
shall have the power to authorize, approve, or consent to a strike by one or more
public employees, and such person shall not authorize, approve, or consent to such
strike."
2 4 Murphy, Public Employee Strikes, in THE CRISIS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
IN THE DECADE OF THE SEVENTIES 71, 79 (R. Murphy & M. Sackman eds. 1970).
25The majority of strikes in the public sector have occurred when an impasse has
been reached during contract negotiations. Consequently the inquiry is directed only
to "interest" disputes (occurring during contract negotiation) as opposed to
"grievance" disputes (occurring during the term of the contract). Presumably,
grievance disputes will be settled as they are in the private sector, namely, through
voluntary arbitration.
Spring, 19721
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employee relations which are currently before -the Ohio General Assembly
will be analyzed and finally, recommendations regarding the creation
of a right to strike will be made.
I. THE BASES OF ANTI-STRIKE LEGISLATION
Numerous theories have been advanced in support of the prohibition
of strikes by public employees. Advocates prohibiting such strikes have
argued that the right to strike is inappropriate in the public sector because
of the fundamental economic differences between the public and private
sectors. 26 Several factors are advanced to support this theory. First, the
prohibition advocates point to the lack of available or feasible substitutes
for many of the services offered by government. The resultant inelasticity
of the demand for these services produces a situation where strikes will
often be successful, simply because unions are in no danger of bidding
themselves out of a competitive market.27 The prohibitionists also point
to the essential nature of many governmental services as a basis for
distinction from the private sector. The essential nature of a service
is directly related to the success of a strike causing its discontinuance--
a fact which may also fail to provide a check on union demands.2 A third
difference often cited is the lack of a profit motive in the public sector.
Because the public employer is not protecting its personal profits, strikers
will encounter only minimal resistance to their demands and strikes will,
therefore, always be successful.29 In addition, the prohibitionists argue
that the public employer lacks methods of applying countervailing
pressure, namely the use of strike breakers and lockouts, that are readily
available to his private counterpart in combatting strikes.30 A final
economic distinction urged is one grounded in law. Because of the
constitutional restriction of legislative delegation of authority, it has been
held invalid to delegate authority to a single person to contractually bind
a governmental entity.3' This results in a situation in which strike settling
negotiations are difficult, if not impossible, to structure.32
On a broader scale, prohibitionists argue that strikes by public
employees are contrary to public policy, which states that there is no
right in any single group to impede the governmental function and
26 For a detailed comparison of the economic conditions in the private and public
sectors see GOVENOR'S COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, STATE OF NEW
YORK, INTERIM REPORT (1968) [hereinafter cited as INTERIM REPORT].27 See Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector,
78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969).
28 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 26, at 26.
29 See Hoffman, The Right of Public Employees to Strike, 16 DEPAUL L. REV. 151
(1966).
30 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 26, at 26.
31City of Cleveland v Division 268, 41 Ohio Op 236, 90 N.E. 2d 711 (1949).
32 Bloch, Public Employees Right to Strike, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 392 (1969).
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deny essential services to the public. 33 The peculiar nature of public
employment itself has been asserted as a reason for denying the right
to strike. The argument, simply stated, is that government employment
has many benefits and much greater security than private employment.
Hence, the acceptance of these emoluments is the quid pro quo for
giving up the right to strike.
34
The concept of sovereignty is the foundation of several prohibitionist
arguments. The first and most direct argument is that the sovereign
cannot be struck.35 Another suggestion is that a public employee is an
agent of the sovereign and as such owes a higher duty to the public which
the existence of the very sovereignty he exercised by striking.3 8 A recent
employs him.3 6 The application of this theory has led some courts to
equate striking in the public sector with treason.37 A closely related
argument maintains that as an agent of the sovereign the public employee
exercises some of its sovereignty, and that an employee cannot then deny
33 Rains, New York Public Employee Relations Laws, 20 LAB. L.J. 264 (1969).
34 See Wellington & Winter, supra note 27. An analogy can be made to Textile
Workers Union v Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) wherein Justice Douglas stated:
"Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an
agreement not to strike." Id. at 455.
35 Bloch, supra note 32.
36 It has been asserted that public employment creates a fiduciary relationship between
the employee and the public. The public employee is thus the trustee responsible
for the continuance of governmental services. It has been stated: "[Elmployment in
the public service frequently... entails a necessary surrender of certain civil rights to
a limited extent because of the dominant public interest in the unimpeded and
uninterrupted performance of the functions of government." Los Angeles v. Building
& Constr. Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 49, 210 P. 2d 305, 318 (1949). See also
Moberly, The Strike and Its Alternatives in Public Employment, 1966 Wis. L. REv.
549 (1966).
37 In a famous decision dealing with the right of public employees to strike, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut discussed the duty of the public employee to
the sovereign and concluded:
In the American system, sovereignty is inherent in the people. They can delegate
it to a government which they create and operate by law. They can give to that
government the power and authority to perform certain duties and furnish
certain services. The government so created and empowered must employ people
to carry on its task. These people are agents of the government. They exercise
some part of the sovereignty entrusted to it. ... They serve the public welfare
and not a private purpose. To say that they can strike is the equivalent of saying
that they can deny the authority of government and contravene the public
welfare.
Norwalk Teachers, Ass'n v. Board of Educ. 138 Conn. 269, 276, 83 A. 2d 482, 490
(1951). Ohio courts have long held a similar view. In a frequently quoted passage
Judge Arti stated:
I think it is clear that in our system of government, the government is a servant
of all the people. And a strike against the public, a strike of public employees,
has been denominated in the decisions cited above, as a rebellion against
government The right to strike, if accorded to public employees, I say, is one
means of destroying government. And if they destroy government, we have
anarchy, we have chaos.
City of Cleveland v. Division 268, 41 Ohio Op. 236, 239, 90 N.E. 2d 711, 715
(C.P. 1949).
38 Rains, supra note 33.
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argument has been put forth which abandons the classical concept of
sovereignty and incorporates the aforementioned economic distinctions
between the public and private sectors to circumscribe a duty of the
sovereign to prohibit strikes by public employees.3 9 This argument, in
brief, is that market restraints are weak in the public sector due to the
essential nature of public services. The public, when faced with
the withdrawal of these essential services, exerts great pressure upon
elected officials to settle the dispute promptly. Public employees are, at
times, able to obtain a greater share of the public funds as a result of the
disproportionate pressure they are able to exert through the leverage
of a strike. Thus strikes by public employees clearly introduce an
alien force into the political process thereby distorting it. The argument
concludes that it is the duty of the sovereign to maintain the purity
of the political process as we know it by barring this potentially
devastating weapon from the political arena.4 0
The arguments for prohibiting strikes by public employees have
been met in every case by those arguing for the right to strike. The
arguments in favor of the right to strike appear to be more persuasive
largely because they are the more empirically supportable.
The main argument raised 'by those advocating a right to strike is
that it is a prerequisite to meaningful collective bargaining. Collective
bargaining is, after all, no more than a process by which two parties
convince each other that each has more to gain 'by agreeing to a specific
proposal than by refusing to do so.4' If public employees cannot strike
then the public employer has little to lose by refusing to agree or even to
bargain at all.42 It has also been asserted that denying public employees the
right to strike is tantamount to the imposition of involuntary servitude.4A3
The argument which seeks to distinguish the public from the private
sector 'based upon the lack of profit motive in the former has also
been countered. Advocates of the right to strike have pointed out that
each governmental unit is under pressure to meet a budget. This
administrative burden will create sufficient countervailing pressure to
resist union demands and coercion."
39 See Wellington & Winter, supra note 27.
40 Id.
41 For a thorough discussion of the nature of collective bargaining in the public sector
see COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE: THEORY AND PRACTICE (K.
Warner ed. 1967).
42 In the absence of any statutorily imposed duty, a public employer is not required
either to recognize or bargain with employee unions. See Seasongood & Barrow,Unionization of Public Employees, 21 U. CIN. L. REV. 327 (1952).
43 Kerman, Strikes and Work Stoppages in the Public Sector, 243 N.Y. STATE B.J.
24, 33 (1971).
44 Hoffman, supra note 29, at 155.
[Vol. 5:2
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The argument that public employee strikes will endanger the public
welfare has also been refuted. Advocates of the right to strike have
pointed out that, in reality, very few public services are so absolutely
essential that they could not be interrupted temporarily.45 Moreover, some
private sector employees are engaged in activity far more crucial than
many public employees. The recent strike of fuel truck drivers in New
York City was said to be responsible for !the deaths of several persons
46
while numerous teachers' strikes have produced considerably less harm.
47
Advocates of the right to strike for public employees have promulgated
two proposals for deciding which public employees should be allowed to
strike and which should be prohibited from striking. The first proposal
distinguishes between so-called proprietary functions and governmental
functions in the public sector. Those public employees who perform tasks
in areas which could be subcontracted to private enterprise, such as
sanitation workers, would be allowed 'to strike while those public
employees performing functions peculiar to sovereignty, such as police
and prison guards, would not be allowed to strike. 48 The second proposal
for deciding which of the public employees should be given the right to
strike is based upon a more amorphous distinction-that of essentiality.
The proponents of this theory advocate a distinction based upon whether
a strike endangers the public health, safety or welfare.
49
The prohibitionist arguments based upon the concept of sovereignty
have also been refuted. In reply to the argument that the sovereign cannot
be struck, advocates of the right to strike assert 'that the sovereignty
concept is an outmoded fiction which has existed far longer than the
45 See Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees,
79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970).
46 N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1968, at 1, col. 1, and Dec. 27, 1968 at 1, col. 5.
47 Burton & Krider, supra note 45, at 427.
48 The courts are divided on the issue of whether those public employees performing
proprietary functions should be allowed to strike. In Local 266, IBEW v. Salt River
Project, 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P. 2d 393 (1955), the court allowed the employees of a
localized power district to strike even though the Arizona State Legislature had made
such districts political subdivisions of the state. The employees were said to be
engaged in a proprietary function by virtue of the fact that the business relationships
of the district both with customers and the union were governed by rules which
regulate private enterprise engaged in similar business. Id. at 44.
The Ohio courts, on the other hand, have expressly rejected any distinction
between governmental and proprietary functions in the area of public employee
strikes. In City of Cleveland v. Division 268, 41 Ohio Op. 236, 90 N.E. 2d 711 (C.P.
1949), the transportation workers' union's argument that the Ferguson Act applied
only to employees engaged in governmental functions was denied. The court held that
the Ferguson Act applied to all public employees regardless of the particular function
in which they are engaged.
49 This distinction is suggested in the GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVISE THE PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1968). For a
criticism of this basis for distinction see Note, Recommendations of the Governor's
Commission to Revise the Public Employment Law of Pennsylvania: A Preliminary
Assessment, 30 U. PITT. L. REv. 161, 171 (1968).
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factors responsible for its creation. 50 The argument that public employees,
as agents of the sovereign, owe a higher duty of loyalty to their employer
has been met by the pragmatic assertion that a public employee will
never continue his reticence out of loyalty while watching his private
sector counterpart benefit substantially through the exercise of strike
privileges.51 Furthermore, job security is no longer absolute in view of
the many recent layoffs and cutbacks by metropolitan employers.5 2
The argument that it is the duty of the sovereign to purge the
political process of the potentially destructive force of public employee
strikes has undergone refutation at each step of its analysis.53 The lack of
market restraints in the public sector due to the essential nature of public
services has been questioned for several reasons. First it is pointed out
that there is an inherent restraint in the strike mechanism itself. Wages
lost during a strike are equally important to a public employee as they are
to a private employee. 54 In addition, public concern over municipal tax
rates is higher now than ever before. The public is just as likely to resist
a strike which will directly affect its tax rates as it is to clamor for
an expensive settlement.55 Another possible source of countervailing
economic pressure lies in the alternative of subcontracting. To the extent
that a municipality is able to subcontract to a private party the particular
task which is the subject of a dispute it will be able to withstand a
prolonged strike or even abolish the public department involved.56 In
order to preserve this option at 'the bargaining table it has -been urged
that legislation prohibiting the relinquishment of the subcontracting right
be enacted.57 The existence of public pressure to settle all public employee
strikes has been questioned. From the empirical evidence available it
appears that the degree of public pressure upon government officials to
settle a strike is directly proportional to the essentiality of the services
withheld.58 The essential nature of a service is related to the number of
feasible alternatives available, the number of alternatives being greater
50 Bloch, supra note 32, at 399.
51 Hoffman, supra note 29, at 154.
52 In Detroit more than 500 city employees have been dropped from the payroll and
2,179 budgeted positions are unfilled. Cleveland has fired 1,725 workers and many
others have been put on shorter work weeks (with less pay). See Cordtz, City Hall
Discoverers Productivity, FORTuNE, Oct., 1971, at 95.
53 See Burton & Krider, supra note 45.
54 Id. at 425.
55 Id. at 427.
56 The City of Warren, Michigan, resolved a bargaining impasse with the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) by subcontracting
out its entire sanitation service. Id. at 425.
57 Burton & Krider, supra note 45, at 426.
58 Statistics on the duration of strikes which occurred in the public sector between1965 and 1968 show that strikes in essential services, such as police and fire lasted an
average of 4.7 days while strikes in other areas last an average of 10.5 days. Id. at 427.
[Vol. 5:2
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as population decreases.59 Thus, it is possible to identify those services
which are highly essential and take proper precautions to curtail or
prohibit strikes in these areas. 6° The conclusion that unions have a much
stronger arsenal than public employers, who lack countervailing weapons,
has also been refuted. Advocates of the right to strike point out that there
is no reason for not legalizing the lockout and the strike simultaneously.
This would provide the public employer with an equal weapon, the
existence of which would diminish the power of the union gained
through the use of a strike.
6
'
The ultimate conclusion that public employee strikes introduce an
alien force into the political process has been seriously questioned for
several reasons. The main answer to this conclusion 'has been that
economic pressure in the political process is no less invidious than political
pressure. All of the objections to economic pressure in the prohibitionist
argument are applicable to the pressure exerted by petitioning and
lobbying, so why not ban all forms of interest group pressure? Once
more, economic pressure is in many cases indistinguishable from political
pressure. 62 Restricting unions solely to the use of political pressure to
gain greater benefits for their membership appears unwise for three
reasons. First, the availability of political power varies among groups of
employees within a given city. This situation produces widely divergent
benefits and unequal representation. Second, the range of issues pursued
by unions relying on political power tends to be narrow. This tendency
would preclude union action on many significant issues of employment.
Third, a labor relations system built on political power is unstable
because many employees are left out of the system.6 Local unions
or crafts which are composed largely of minorities or who may have
endorsed a candidate that was politically embarrassing to the union
leadership have been victims of union discrimination in the past.tf
4
A final argument which is perhaps the most effective of all those
made by advocates for the right to strike is based upon the problems
caused by the existence of the statutory prohibition itself. Faced with the
illegality of a strike, public employees must not only make up their
minds to abandon their employment thereby depriving themselves of
all income, but in addition must make a deli'berate decision to violate
the law which forbids them from striking. The decision to defy the
law and, in some instances, the courts is one generated by the most
vitriolic militancy and rancor. This attitude of the workers serves only
59 Id. at 427.
60 Id. at 438.
61 Id. at 428.
62 Id. at 429.
63 Id. at 431.
64 Id.
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to exacerbate the dispute. To the extent that any law is violated on
a widespread basis, respect for the particular law violated diminishes.6 5
A strike is not, of course, the only method of resolving an impasse
in collective bargaining. Several alternatives do exist.
III. ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPASSE RESOLUTION
A. Mediation
When collective bargaining reaches an impasse or becomes stalled
for any reason the parties first resort to mediation. It has been said that:
"The mediator provides a channel of communication for the parties.
Sometimes he carries messages between the parties; at other times he
helps to clarify arguments. He makes recommendations only when
he is confident that they will be accepted by both parties."' 66 Mediators
are 'basically talkers who enter into a stalled negotiation and serve
a lubricating function which eliminates antagonisms between patties.67
These antagonisms are part of any collective bargaining process arising
inevitably from the irrationality and emotionalism of the parties. A
mediator will usually begin by 'talking 'to each group separately to
discover each side's view of why 'the other is impairing negotiations.
This process provides an emotional release for both sides through
the venting of their antagonisms. Once these antagonisms have been
vented, negotiations may continue.
The mediator then assesses each side's position on the various
issues. The skilled mediator, sensitized by his experience, can detect
exactly how far each side is willing to go on a particular issue thereby
enabling him to reinstitute bargaining on an issue by issue basis, beginning
with those issues on which agreement is most likely to be reached. As
agreement is reached on the preliminary issues, momentum gradually
builds to the point necessary to overcome the more difficullt obstacles.
Progress is thus attained on a step by step basis and is usually accompa-
nied by a gradual change in the attitude of the parties from antagonistic
pessimism to the conciliatory optimism necessary to produce agreement.68
65 Kerman, supra note 43, at 33.
66 M. Mosxow, J. LOEWENBERG, E. KOZIARA, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT, 279 (1970).
67 In 1947 Congress created the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service as part
of the Taft-Hartley Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 171-74 (1970). This service, composed of
experienced labor mediators has been highly successful despite the absence of any
legal compulsion over the parties.
68 For an imaginative proposal involving the use of mediators in public employment
collective bargaining see Lev, Strikes by Government Employees: Problems and
Solutions, 57 A.B.A.J. 771 (1971). For a further discussion of mediation see R.
POSEY, MANAGEMENT RELATIONS wrT ORGANIZED PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 69 (1963);
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note
41, at 129.
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B. Fact Finding
One procedure which has found increased acceptance in the public
sector is called fact finding.69 This procedure musft be resofted 'to when
parties to the dispute, or the public agency with supervision powers over
all aspects of public employee relations, become aware that mediation
techniques are insufficient to bring about agreement. 70  Mediation
techniques are inadequate when the parties' self-interest in the issue
precludes them from interpreting the facts in dispute objectively. rt is at
this stage of the negotiations that a fact finder will be consulted.3
The role of 'the fact finder is to objectively inquire into matters
pertinent to the dispute and then submit his recommendations to the
parties. 72 The presumption is that objective fact finding will show one
party's interpretation of the evidence to be more credible than the other's
and hopefully the compelling force of this credibility will induce
the adverse patty to accept the fact finder's recommendations. This
compulsion is reinforced when the recommendations are made available
to the public. 73 Public availability may be conditioned, however, on
whether the parties accept or reject the recommendations-if they are
accepted then the recommendations may remain private.
74
When the parties are obliged to accept 'the recommendations the
procedure is no different than compulsory arbitration. Likewise, when
the parties are free to reject the recommendations, the procedure is
69 See Howlett, Comment, Fact-Finding: Its Values and Limitations, in ARBITRATION
AND THE EXPANDING ROLE OF NEuTyws 176 n. 2 (G. Somers & B. Dennis eds. 1970),
for a listing of 20 state statutes which have adopted fact finding as the terminal point
in public employee relations.
70 The Labor Mediation Board of Michigan has promulgated the rule that the parties
must have engaged in mediation before they can apply for fact finding. See Roumell,
The Role of the Fact Finder in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 85,
86 (Practising Law Institute ed. 1968). In addition, the public employer must have
agreed at the start of mediation to resort to fact finding when and if mediation fails.
Krimsky, Public Employment Fact-Finding in Fourteen States, in COLLECTIVE
NEGOTIATION FOR PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES 211, 215 (R. Woodworth
& R. Peterson eds. 1969).
71 The normal procedure is for the fact finder to be a single individual, however,
tripartite panels might also be utilized. See Howlett, supra note 69, at 180-81.
72 Roumell, supra note 70, at 87. There is some discussion of fact finding without
the making of subsequent recommendations by Simkin, Fact-Finding: Its Values and
Limitations, in ARBITRATION AND THE EXPANDING ROLE OF NEUTRALS, 165. 167-68
(G. Somers & B. Dennis eds. 1970). This type of procedure, however, is rarely used.
73 Sackman, Impasse Resolution-Alternatives to Strikes, in THE CRISIS IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE DECADE OF THE SEVENTIES 97, 99-100 (R. Murphy &
M. Sackman eds. 1970).
74 Id. at 100.
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similar in nature to advisory arbitration. 75 In either event, the fact finder
operates essentially as an arbitrator.76
If fact finding is the terminal point in negotiations, the union is
normally not an equal party to the proceedings. This inequality occurs
because the employer is normally granted the right to reject the fact
finder's recommendations with relative impunity.77 The union however,
being denied the right to strike, is left with no alternatives. A solution
to this inequity is partially obtained when, instead of being the terminal
point, fact finding is made only a step in the resolution process.78 Thus,
upon receipt of the fact finder's recommendations, the parties may
return to the bargaining table for further negotiations. It has been
noted, however, that when fact finding is merely a preliminary
procedure, there is an increasing tendency for both parties to reject
the recommendations as the basis for their agreement. 79
C. Arbitration
Arbitration consists of two types-advisory and binding. 0 As noted
earlier, fact finding with nonbinding recommendations is in the nature of
advisory arbitration. In fact, advisory arbitration is the logical conclusion
of fact finding as the arbitrator renders a decision which the parties should
accept.8' Under the guise of the arbitration label the loser is better able
to ra'tionalize the result to its constituency. However, advisory arbitration
will represent an exercise in futility if the loser elects to reject the
arbtrator's decision. Thus advisory arbitration can hardly be thought
of as a true alternative to impasse resolution.
Compulsory arbitration, on the other hand, has frequently been
considered as such an alternative.8 2 In compulsory arbitration, when
preliminary procedures such as mediation and fact finding have not been
successful in resolving the dispute, the issue is submitted to an arbitrator
whose decision is binding on the parties. The arbitrator selected may or
may not 'be in the government service. If it is assumed that compulsory
75 See Simkin, supra note 72, at 168.
76 The limitations of and objections to arbitration will be considered in the next
section. See notes 80-91 infra and accompanying text.
77 Wurf, The Use of Factfinding in Dispute Settlement, in SORRY... No GOVERNMENT
TODAY 80, 87 (R. Walsh ed. 1969).
7s See notes 92-108 infra and accompanying text.
79 Sackman, supra note 73, at 100.
80 For a discussion of grievance arbitration in the public sector see Sullivan, Binding
Arbitration in Public Employment Labor Disputes, 36 U. CIN. L. REV. 666, 677-79
(1967).
81 Sackman, supra note 73, at 100.
82 See Shenton, Compulsory Arbitration in the Public Service, in COLLECTIVE
BARGAININO IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 191, 203 (D. Kruger & C. Schmidt, Jr., eds.
1969).
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arbitration entails both mediation and fact finding,
83 then it has superficial
plausibility. However, a legion of objections have been raised against
it. Historically, compulsory arbitration was considered illegal as an
unauthorized delegation of governmental powers.
8 4 However, since the
decision in Norwalk Teacher's Association v. Board oj Education,85 this
argument has met with little success. The most pervasive argument against
compulsory arbitration is that it distorts the concept of good faith
bargaining.8 6 Since the party with an extremely weak bargaining position
will never engage in serious negotiations, preferring instead to go to
arbitration with the expectation that the arbitrator's decision will be
a more favorable one than the party could have exacted through collective
bargaining.8 7 Another contention is that compulsory arlbitration infringes
upon the employee's prerogative to reject proposals.88 In essence, both
parties are deprived of freedom at the bargaining table. Finally, each
party tends to view with suspicion an arbitrator's competence in the
specific dispute,89 which thereby tends to render compliance with
the award difficult if the dissatisfied party is the union.
90
While some commentators have viewed compulsory arbitration as a
panacea, most 'have not.91 Yet, despite the obvious defects of compulsory
arbitration, many still feel that when certain strikes, such as police or
firemen are unthinkable, it is the only alternative.
D. Limited Right to Strike
Realization that an absolute prohibition of strikes is futile is not
a new development. For many years, writers have been urging upon
83 See Sackman, supra note 73, at 100-01.
84 See, e.g., Mann v. Richardson, 66 Il. 481 (1873); City of Cleveland v. Division
268, Amalgamated Ass'n Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 85 Ohio App. 153, 85 N.E.
2d 811 (1949).
85138 Conn. 269, 83 A. 2d 482 (1951). The court concluded that arbitration was
permissible under Connecticut law and further stated that arbitration deserved the
"enthusiastic support" of the courts. See Griffin, The Challenge of Public Employee
Bargaining, in SORRY ... No GOVERNMENT TODAY, 283, 288-89 (R. Walsh ed. 1969).
86Brown, Jr., No Strikes for Government Employees, But..., in COLLECTIVE
NEGOTIATION FOR PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES 38, 40 (R. Woodworth &
R. Peterson eds. 1969). See also Sullivan, Court Arbitration of Public Employee
Labor Relations Disputes, 10 N.H.B.J. 84 (1967).
87 Zack, Dispute Settlement in the Public Sector, 14 N.Y.U.L.F. 249, 259 (1968).
88 Warner, Cities at the Bargaining Table, in SoRRY... No GOVERNMENT TODAY 34,
38 (R. Walsh ed. 1969).
89 Id. at 38.
90 Zack, supra note 87, at 259.
91 See, e.g., Sackman, supra note 73, at 101.
Spring, 19721
13
Hoffman and Newman: Public Employee Strikes
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1972
state legislators the concept of a limited right to strike. 92 Under this
concept, the right to strike is extended to a limited number of employees.
The proposals have considered various methods to arrive at the limited
groups of employees who may exercise this right. The most common
method has been the functional approach--employees who serve an
essential function are prohibited from striking while those serving in
a nonessential function are not.93
The arguments in favor of the essential-nonessential distinction are
fairly obvious. Foremost is the fact that under every definition of essential
services police and fire fighters are included. This tends to soothe the
fears of 'those concerned with the health, safety and welfare of the public.
Also with such a distinction, public officials could anticipate greater
public support since the public remains apathetic until the essential
services are disrupted.9 4 Finally, to date, there has been no large clamoring
for the right to be extended to these two groups of employees.
The objections which have been raised against the limited right to
strike for employees engaged in nonessential services are directed at the
inherent definitional difficulties. One argument is that the apriori
delineation of what services are essential and which are not defies legislative
acumen. 96 Another states that when an essential service is finally defined
it will cut across to the private sector where employees can be found
performing identical services as those described as essential. 97 However,
92 See, e.g., Rains, Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 8 LAB. L.J. 548(1957); Steiber, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, in CHALLENGES TOCOLLECTIVE BARGAINING 65, 81 (L. Ulman ed. 1967); Note, Labor Relations in thePublic Service, 75 HARv. L. REV. 391 (1961). But see Taylor, Public Employment:
Strikes or Procedures?, 20 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 617 (1967).
93 Kilberg, Labor Relations in the Municipal Service, 7 HA v. J. LEIS. 1, 30-31(1969). See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 10, at 46-47. Burton& Krider, supra note 45, at 427, suggest that the services be broken down into the
following three categories:
(1) essential services-police and fire-where strikes immediately endangerpublic health and safety; (2) intermediate services-sanitation hospitals, transit,
water, and sewage-where strikes of a few days might be tolerated; (3) non-
essential services-streets, parks, education, housing, welfare and general
administration-where strikes of indefinite duration could be tolerated.9 4 
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 10, at 47.
95 See, e.g., Policy Statement on Public Employee Unions: Rights and Responsibilities(Adopted by International Executive Board, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, July 26, 1966), inSORRY... No GOVERNMENT TODAY 67, 68 (R. Walsh ed. 1969); Comment, CollectiveBargaining for Public Employees and the Prevention of Strikes in the Public Sector,68 MICH. L. REV. 260, 271 (1969); Note, Public Employee Labor Relations: Proposalsfor Change in Present State Legislation, 20 VAND. L. REV. 700, 708 (1967).96 This problem appeared so overwhelming to the Taylor Committee when it waspreparing New York's current legislation on the matter, that the decision was madeto continue the absolute prohibition of public employee strikes. See N.Y. CIr. SERV.
LAw 1 210 (McKinney Supp. 1971).97 Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. L.REV. 943, 950-51 (1969).
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this argument contemplates a more expanded concept of "essential" than
is normally promulgated. 98 As will be seen, neither objection has presented
obstacles to legislatures intent on providing some 'balance in the public
collective bargaining setting.
Montana has provided that nurses may strike under a certain
condition. The limiting condition is that there must be another health care
facility available within a 150 mile radius of the facility being struck
which has not simultaneously been shut down by a strike. 99 Why that
state has limited the right strictly to nurses is not clear.
The most commonly discussed concept of the limited right to strike
is manifested in Pennsylvania's recently enacted legislation. Police and
fire fighters are denied the right and instead must resort to compulsory
arbitration for resoldtion of impasse disputes.100 In addition, guards at
prisons and mental hospitals, along with all personnel necessary to the
functioning of the state courts are absolutely prohibited from striking.'0 '
All other personnel may exercise the right to strike but only after
mediation and fact finding procedures "have been completely utilized
and exhausted."' 1 2 A further restriction on the right is available to
employers when, in their opinion, a strike may create a clear and present
danger or threat to the public's health, safety, or welfare. The employer
may seek injunctive relief as well as other equitable remedies which
will be granted if the employer can prove his claim to the court.0 3
Resort to the courts for a determination of the clear and present
danger to the health, safety, and welfare of the public is arguably an
escape from a perplexing problem by the legislature. This criticism is more
appropriately directed at a statute such as Vermont's where all public
employees (except state employees) are granted the right to strike subject
to the employer's right to obtain an injunction where the strike will
"endanger" the health, safety, or welfare of the public.104 Conceivably,
any strike could be considered to pose such a threat. This problem is not
merely hypothetical. In Septa v. Transport Workers of Philadelphia,05 the
98 "A determination of essentiality might easily be made in advance with respect to
police and fire services, but it would be difficult to categorize many other situations."
Id. at 951.
99 MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 41-2209 (Supp. 1971).
100PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.03 (Supp. 1971).
101 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1001 (Supp. 1971).
102Id. at § 1101.1003 (Supp. 1971).
103 Id.
104 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1704 (Supp. 1968). While state employees are prohibited
from striking, it appears that to enjoin a teacher strike, the state will have to meet the
same burden of proving that the strike is a clear and present danger to the educational
program. Edwards, supra note 9, at 11.16.
105 No. 1179 (C.P. Philadelphia County, Apr. 14, 1971), oral opinion published in
77 L.R.R.M. 2489 (1971).
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bus drivers had gone out on strike and the Transit Authority sought
a preliminary injunction to curtail them. In issuing the injunction, the
Pennsylvania court left little doubt that any strike by a public employee
might be enjoined.106 Hence if the legislature does not provide the judiciary
with some guidelines, the establishment of a limited Tight to strike may
result in an -absolute prohibition by the judiciary.
In this regard, it will be interesting to watch the development under
Hawaii's new statute which provides every public employee the right to
strike.107 This right of course is conditioned upon the employee's good
faith compliance with statutory impasse procedures. 108 This statute,
however, creates a state board (Public Employee Relations Board) to
supervise all conduct under the statute. 0 9 The board is given the power
to evaluate the threat which the strike poses to the community, and it
may impose requirements on the strikers to protect the public. A board
consisting of persons skilled in public employee relations would appear
to be a much more appropriate solution to the problems of balancing
community and employee interests than the method of giving the employer
free access to the courts to secure injunctions.
At this point it will be worthwhile to consider proposals currently
before the Ohio General Assembly dealing with the issue of public
employee strikes.
IV. BILLS CURRENTLY BEFORE THE OHIO GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Numerous bills have recently been introduced for consideration by the
Ohio General Assembly, though for only four is consideration expected to
be serious." 0 Two bills-the Administration's bill introduced by Senators
Bowen and Mottle,"' and the Ohio Bar Association Labor Law Commit-
tee's bill (Labor bill) introduced by Senator Cook"--would repeal the
Ferguson Act and incorporate the distinction between essential and
106 The court felt that the strike (1) caused traffic congestion to such a degree that it
was a threat to safety and was a danger to (2) the aged, (3) the prison system, (4) ajob training program, (5) those in need of medical attention, (6) the school system,
and finally (7) the economic welfare. Certainly such concern can only be described
as excessive paternalism.
107 HAWAII REV. LAWS I 89-12(c) (Supp. 1970).
108 Mediation and fact finding are mandatory preliminary procedures. HAWAII Rav.LAws 1 89-11(b) (1) & (2), (Supp. 1970). If the parties agree, voluntary arbitration
may be resorted to, but the results are binding. Id. I 89-11(b) (3) (Supp. 1970).
109 HAWAII REV. LAWS 1 89-5 (Supp. 1970).
110 Five bills have been introduced into the Senate and ten bills have been introduced
into the House of Representatives, according to Mr. Newburger, the Deputy Directorfor Policy Planning for the Ohio Department of Commerce.
11" S.B. 194, 109th Gen. Ass'y, Reg. Sess. 9 1 (1971-72), enacting OHIO REV. CODE If
4119.01-.17 (hereinafter cited as S.B. 194.
112 S.B. 344, 109th Gen. Ass'y, Reg. Sess. 1 1 (1971-72), enacting OHIO REV. CODE It
4117.01-.21 & .99 [hereinafter cited as S.B. 344).
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nonessential services while authorizing a limited right to strike. Because
these bills share many similarities they will be discussed concurrently.
An Employee Relations Board is established in both the Administra-
tion and the Labor bills. The structure and function of this Board is
extremely similar to the National Labor Relations Board."13 The Board, as
provided in either bill, would consist of five members to be appointed
by the Governor for six-year staggered terms. 1 4 The Labor bill contains
the proviso that no more than three of the five members of the Board shall
belong to the same political party. While it may be argued that such a
proviso is no guarantee of balanced objectivity on the Board, nonetheless,
the Administration bill, which contains no such limitation on the
Governor's appointment power, would appear to be deficient in that
matter. The political ramifications loom larger when it is noted that each
bill authorizes the Board to appoint employees to positions deemed
necessary to allow the Board to carry out its functions. These positions
include mediators, fact finders, and arbitrators. As this article is concerned
primarily with the problems of impasse resolution, however, the many
other facets of these bills will not be discussed.-'
Impasse resolution procedures may be agreed upon by both parties
and contained in their collective bargaining agreement under the
Administration bill. When negotiations commence, the agreement as to
impasse resolution procedures contained in the existing contract will
prevail over the procedures provided for in the statute." 6 Where the
existing contract does not provide for voluntary binding arbitration of
the dispute and the parties are unable to reach an agreement they may
avail themselves of the Board's assistance by notifying the Board of the
impasse. This notification, however, must be made sixty days prior to
the termination date of the existing contract." 7 The Labor bill, on the
other hand, does not mention the possibility of impasse resolution
procedures being contained in the existing contract but it does require
the parties to notify the Board of the impasse thirty days prior to the
termination of the contract.m
"13 See S.B. 194, enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4119.05, and S.B. 344, enacting OHIO
REv. CODE § 4117.05 (1970).
14 S.B. 194, enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4119.05 (A) & (D) and S.B. 344, enacting
OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.05(c).
215 Other aspects of both bills include the delineation of unfair labor practices,
provisions for recognition of the appropriate unit, supervisory control over the Board
by a citizen's advisory council, and even the election procedures. An interesting
comparison can be made between the proposals contained in the bills and the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. H 151 et seq. (1970).
116 S.B. 194, enacting OHIo REv. CODE 1 4119.13(A).
M7 Id. enacting OHIo R v. CODE 1 4119.13(A) (1).
118 S.B. 344, enacting OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.13(B).
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When an impasse in bargaining is reached, the Board is authorized
under both bills to appoint a mediator to assist the parties. 119 If mediation
is unsuccessful in enabling the parties to reach an agreement, the
mediator will certify to the Board that the impasse still exists. Both
bills provide for fact finding at this stage of the negotiations. The Labor
bill requires the Board to impose fact finding on the parties, 20 whereas
the Administration bill leaves the imposition up to the discretion of the
Board.' 2' A fact finding panel consisting of not more than three members
is a common provision of the bills. Under the Administration bill, if
the Board decides to impose fact finding on the parties, they must be
in agreement as to the members appointed to the panel.122
The emphasis placed on the fact finding procedure is quite disparate
in the two bills. The Administration bill appears to place little emphasis on
the procedure and to treat it in a rather cursory manner. The fact finding
panel, speaking through its majority, is required to transmit its findings
and recommendations to the parties involved in the dispute.12 No mention
is ever made as to the Board being able to make the findings and
recommendations public at a later time. Thus the pressure of public
opinion is not brought to bear on the parties as an aftermath of the
procedure. If, within ten days after they have received the findings and
recommendations, the parties are still unable to resolve the impasse, they
may then resort to further procedures which are discussed subsequently. 124
The Labor bill, however, does not ignore the reality of public opinion. If
the parties do not reach an agreement within ten days after they have
received the panel's findings and recommendations the Board may, in its
discretion, make public its recommendations. 25 Should either party refuse
to accept in whole or in part the panel's recommendations, the chief
legal officer of the public employer involved must, within five days after
receipt of the findings and recommendations by the parties, submit them
to the legislative body of the public employer. 26 Nonacceptance at this
stage by either party will trigger the limited right to strike provisions
119S.B. 194, enacting OHio REv. CODE § 4119.13 (A) (4); S.B. 344, enacting OHIO
REv. CODE § 4117.13(C).
120 S.B. 344, enacting OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.13(D).
121 S.B. 194, enacting OHIo REv. CODE § 4119.13(A) (4).
122 Id. S.B. 344 contains no such requirement.
I2 This procedure is the same in both bills. Compare S.B. 194, enacting OHIO REv.
CODE § 4119.13(A) (5) with S.B. 344, enacting OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.13(E).
124 See notes 128-33 infra and accompanying text.
1M S.B. 344, enacting OHIo REv. CODE § 4117.13(F) provides that the Board: "[M]ay
take whatever steps it considers appropriate to resolve the dispute, including the
making of public recommendations after giving due consideration to the findings of
fact and recommendations of such fact-finding board."
126 S.B. 344, enacting OHIO Rav. CODE § 4117.13(G).
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contained in both bills though they require that the parties exhaust all of
the above procedures before resorting to a strike.12 7
The Administration bill expressly prohibits police, firemen, and
guards at penal or mental institutions from striking.128 Thus when an
impasse still exists between these employees and a public employer ten
days after they have received the fact finding panel's findings and
recommendations, the matter must be submitted to final and binding
arbitration. 12 All other public employees are granted the right to strike- 30
However, if the public employer is of the opinion that the strike represents
a clear and present danger to the health and safety of the public, it may
request from the Board authorization to enjoin the strike. 131 If the Board
concurs in the public employer's fear that the strike would constitute such
a danger, it may authorize the employer to seek an injunction of the strike
in the court of common pleas in the county where the parties to the
dispute are situated. The court is precluded from issuing an injunction
unless the employer has obtained authorization to seek it from the Board.
If the authorization has been obtained the court, under its general equity
jurisdiction, will determine whether or not to issue the injunction.
When the court issues an injunction, the Board is given a continuing
duty to attempt to mediate the dispute. 3 2 However, if the parties are
unable to resolve the dispute within ten days after the injunction has been
issued, the Board will appoint an arbitrator to make a determination which
will be final and binding on both parties.12 Employees who are not
subject to statutory or judicial prohibitions against striking have no
limits placed on the period of time they may withhold their services,
and no further procedures are imposed upon the parties in their attempt
to resolve the impasse.
The Labor bill incorporates the essential-nonessential distinction also
but provides for a much different method to determine which employees
127 S.B. 194, enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4119.13(A) (6). For employees authorized
to strike, the Labor bill requires that 45 days elapse after the parties have received
the fact finding panel's recommendations, before the employees may strike. S.B. 344,
enacting OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.15(D).
128 S.B. 194, enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4119.13(A) (6) (A).
129 The selection of an arbitrator is left up to the parties. If the selection is not made
within five days, however, the Board will appoint an arbitrator from the list of
qualified persons which the Board maintains. Id.
130 S.B. 194, enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4119.13(A) (6) (B). The Board may, at its
discretion, attempt mediation of the dispute at any time during the negotiations. Id.
131 S.B. 194, enacting OHIO REv. CODE 1 4119.14(A). This power apparently is
intended to cover strikes by police, firemen, etc. also.
132 Id. enacting OHIO REV. CODE 14119.14(B).
M3 Id. enacting OHIo REv. CODE 1 4119.14(C). Before the ten-day period has elapsed,
however, the parties may select an arbitrator to make the determination. Id.
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are essential, and, hence, may not strike.3 4 Essential employees are
denominated as "excepted" in the bill. Excepted employees are those
"whose duties are wholly or substantially necessary or essential to the
safety or security of the public." 135 The Board, at the request of the public
employer or labor organization, determines which classes of employees
are to be encompassed by the statutory description.136 While the Board's
determination is quite likely to result in a stratification similar to that
made legislatively in the Administration bill,3 7 such a result is not
absolutely required. When either party applies to the Board for a
determination as to whether the employees are excepted, both parties may
submit written statements to the Board in support of their position.3
Conceivably the police or firemen in a small town might not be held
by the Board to be excepted employees. In this respect the Labor bill
appears to be more flexible than the Administration's bill. A further
positive factor is that the determination will be made by specialists in
the area of public employment.
If the determination is that a group of employees is to be considered
excepted, then when an impasse extends ten days beyond receipt of the
fact finding panel's recommendations, those recommendations become
final and binding on the parties."39 However, employees not specifically
prohibited from striking may do so if the parties have not reached an
agreement within forty-five days following the receipt of the fact finding
panel's recommendations. 140 The strike may continue until an agreement
is reached. While the employees are out on strike, the public employer has
authority to engage the services of subcontractors or other employees to
perform the work of the striking employees." 41 This right is not authorized
in the Administration bill and possibly with good reason. The Administra-
tion bill imposes an affirmative duty on the employer to bargain in good
faith after the employees have gone out on strike whereas a good faith
134 In addition, employees who are not included in a bargaining unit for which a
Labor organization has been certified by the Board are prohibited from engaging in
a strike. S.B. 344, enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.15(A).
'3 Id. enacting OHIO REV. CODE §4117.14(A).
136 Id. enacting OHIo REV. CODE §4117.14(B) & (C).
137 The Administration bill expressly prohibits policemen, firemen, and guards at
penal or mental institutions from striking. S.B. 194, enacting OHIO REV. CODE §
4119.13(A) (6) (A).
'38 S.B. 344, enacting Omo REV. CODE § 4117.14(B).
339 Id. enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.14(E).
140 Id. enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.15(D). The Board determines when a strike
violates the provisions of Section 4117.15. If it finds a violation after a full hearing,
the Board shall order a cease and desist order and any other affirmative relief or
action, including the award of damages to the affected employer. These orders are
enforceable by the Court of Appeals, upon petition by the Board. Id. enacting OHIO
REV. CODE § 4117.16(A)-(F).
141lId.
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requirement is absent in the Labor bill.142 Thus, under the Labor bill, there
is no compelling motivation for the public employer to engage in
meaningful collective bargaining as the ire of the community will not be
raised so long as the services are being performed. Consequently, the
subcontracting provision could serve to undermine the union's efforts
at the bargaining table unless a good faith criterion is read into the
general duty to bargain.
A final and seemingly unnecessary provision of the Labor bill allows
for the Governor, if he feels that a potential strike will imperil the health
or safety of the public, to secure the recommendations of the fact finding
panel and make them available to the public. 4 He may then petition,
through the Attorney General, any court of appeals having jurisdiction
over the parties to enjoin the strike. 44 The court may issue the restraining
order if it is convinced of the Governor's fears.1 5 When an injunction is
issued by a court of appeals, the parties remain under a continuing duty
to negotiate. If they are unable to reach an agreement within sixty days
the Board must submit a statement of each party's position and the public
employer's last offer of settlement to the Governor, who may make them
available to the public. 146 During the next fifteen days the Board will take
a secret ballot of the employees to see if they wish to accept the last offer
of settlement made by the employer. The results of this ballot are certified
by the Board to the Attorney General,147 who will then move to have the
142 Both bills provide that: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a public employer
to: ... (5) Refuse to bargain collective with the representative of his employees
certified pursuant to Chapter 4119 of the Revised Code." S.B. 194, enacting OHIO
RaV. CODE § 4119.04(A) (5). See S.B. 344 enacting OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.04(A)
(5) & (C). In this respect they contain essentially the same language as that found
in the National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970). The requirement that
the parties bargain collectively in good faith is limited in the NLRA to "wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). The
Administration bill goes beyond this to requiring good faith bargaining to "the
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder. S.B. 194,
enacting OHIO REv. CODE § 4119.09(B).
143 S.B. 344, enacting OHIo REV. CODE § 4117.17(A). The precise language of the
section is that the Governor "may direct the Ohio Public Employment Relations
Board to submit a copy of the findings of fact and recommendations of the Board to
him within such time as he prescribes." It is not entirely clear whether the reference
is to the recommendations of the fact finding panel or those made by the Board-in
its discretion, ten days after the parties have received the panel's recommendations
and have still not resolved the impasse-which may be made public.
144 This section talks about "a threatened or actual strike or lockout affecting a
public employer," however, it is the first time the term lock-out is used in the bill. In
context, it would appear that the drafters are treating it as a weapon of the employees,
but common knowledge instructs that the lock-out is an employer's counter to a strike
threat. It might be inferred that the public employer has been given the lock-out
weapon but the inference is quite weak when it is drawn fr3m the section dealing
with the Governor's emergency powers. Consideration of this point should certainly
be made by the Ohio General Assembly.
145. S.B. 344, enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.17(B).
146 Id. enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.17 (C).
147 Id.
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injunction discharged. 148 Upon the court's granting of the motion to
discharge, the Governor will submit a comprehensive report to the
General Assembly along with any recommendations he sees fit to make.149
All of the procedures related to the Governor's intervention serve to
undermine both the Board and the Labor organization involved. The
integrity of the Board suffers because the Governor, in an overseer
function, is performing a function which the Board was created and is
authorized to do. Such intervention is likely to be only a political act, but,
it could generate a presumption of the Board's ineptitude. The Labor
organization is undermined when the secret ballot is taken of its members.
In the private sector, normal union politics tend to purge leadership whose
interests become alienated from the membership's, and no reason exists
to suppose that the same process would not occur in the public unions.
A third bill,150 sponsored by Senator Leedy, is novel in several
respects. Unlike the other bills addressing this subject, it does not
repeal the Ferguson Act. The bill operates in conjunction with the
Ferguson Act to continue to prohibit public employee strikes with
one exception. When a public employer refuses to abide by the result
of binding arbitration, the bill's terminal procedure for impasse resolution,
its employees are exempted from the Ferguson Act in that its sanctions
no longer apply.15' This exception is sufficiently narrow so as to be
tantamount to a continuance of the Ferguson Act prohibition per se
and is the major shortcoming of the bill.
Although the Leedy bill also establishes a Public Employee Personnel
Board similar to the National Labor Relations Board, the role of the
Board differs substantially from that of the Administration and Labor
bills. This Board, composed of three members appointed for staggered
six-year terms, may act only when requested to do so by one of
the parties involved in an impasse. 52 If the parties elect to do so
they may structure impasse resolution procedures culminating in binding
arbitration in the complete absence of Board supervision and assistance.
The procedural options available to unions and employers for impasse
resolution are the most imaginative feature of the bill and, on that
basis, merit serious consideration.
Under the Leedy bill, impasse resolution procedures may be the
subject of a prior agreement or may be invoked by the parties at the time
148 Id. enacting OHio REV. CODE § 4117.17 (D).
149 Id. Presumably the employees may resort to a strike upon the lifting of the
injunction-
150S.B. 340, 109th Gen. Ass'y, Reg. Sess. § 1 (1971-72), enacting OHio REV. CODE
HI 3319.45-.55 and 4119.01-.20 [hereinafter cited as S.B. 340].
151 S.B. 340, enacting OHIo REv. CODE § 4119.13.
152 S.B. 340, enacting OHIO REV. CODE § § 4119.14-.20.
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of impasse. 153 Negotiations may begin at the request of either party at any
time.154 Once begun, the negotiations must be completed within thirty
days or an impasse situation is declared. 155 If agreement is not reached
within thirty days both parties have the option of requesting the
intervention of a local fact finding committee and advising the Board that
an impasse exists or continuing to negotiate under time limits set by prior
agreement. 5 6 The local fact finding committee is to be made up of three
members, one selected by the union, the other selected by the public
employer, and a chairman selected either by the first two members or by
the Board if they cannot agree. 15 7 The absence of restrictions on selection
of committee members is sagacious insofar as it will allow locally
prominent people to participate, thereby lending greater credence to
committee findings. After selection, the fact finding committee may review
matters under dispute, conduct hearings, and consider statements made
either by the parties or others in reaching its conclusions.158 A report
embodying these conclusions is then made available simultaneously
to the parties and the public within ten days following selection.'5
Publication of the report is a necessary corollary to the prominence
of the local committee; the credibility attributed to its findings will serve
to maximize public pressure for settlement.
If the impasse is resolved at this stage the public employer simply
notifies the Board and the contract is ratified by both sides. 16° If, however,
the impasse persists, the parties are faced with yet another choice. They
may either request intervention by the Board or allow the impasse to
go to binding arbitration as required by the bill. 6' If the parties allow
the dispute to go to arbitration, they must select an arbitrator from
a list provided by the American Arbitration Association.162 The
arbitrator's decision is binding on both parties.163
At this juncture the right to strike arises in its limited form. If the
public employer does not accept the decision of the arbitrator, the penalties
of the Ferguson Act are suspended with regard to the employees. 164 If, on
153Id. enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4119.08. See also note 116 supra and accom-
panying text.
154 Id.
'55 S.B. 340, enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4119.09.
156 id.
157 S.B. 340, enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4119.10.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 S.B. 340, enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4119.12.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 S.B. 340, enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4119.13.
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the other hand, the union or the public employees refuse to accept the
arbitrator's decision then the Ferguson Act penalties do apply.1 65
If either party seeks intervention prior to binding arbitration, the
Board invokes the somewhat standard steps of impasse resolution
procedure beginning with mediation. The Board appoints the mediator
from a list maintained by it. 16 6 If the mediation is unsuccessful, either
the mediator or the parties may request the Board to empanel a state
fact finding board. The three members of the state fact finding board
are selected by the Board from a list of qualified persons maintained
for this purpose. Within ten days the fact finding board makes its
recommendations available to the parties and the Board, but regrettably
does not make them available to the public. 67 The Board may modify
the recommendations of the fact finding board and if the impasse still
persists, it may require the parties to submit to binding arbitration
under the same procedure imposed upon the parties if they had not
requested Board intervention. 1 8
Overshadowing this entire area is the good faith bargaining
requirement provided in the bill. The requirement is enforced by the
Board which has the power to investigate breaches of good faith, make
determinations of the meaning of any provision in an existing collective
bargaining agreement, and to make such determinations and issue such
orders as may be reasonable and necessary to effect any breach of good
faith found to exist.169 The Board may enforce its determinations and
orders by applying to the court of common pleas for an injunction
wherever the violation occurs or a violator is found. 70
A final factor of significance in the Leedy bill is its retention of
individual negotiations throughout the public employee sector. These
negotiations, termed "professional negotiations," are to remain wherever
they preexisted the bill and may be created under it.' r7 This provision
would appear unwise because although it appeals to many professionals
in public employment who may be able to bargain effectively alone, it
nevertheless undercuts union power in bargaining. Bargaining strength
165 Id.
166 S.B. 340, enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4119.20(B) (1).
167 Id. enacting OHIO REV. CODE 1 4119.20(B) (3).
168 See note 164 supra and accompanying text.
169 S.B. 340, enacting OHIo REV. CODE 14119.20 (C).
170 Id.
71 S.B. 340, enacting Omno REv. CODE § 4119.13. Another novel feature of the Leedy
bill is its separate treatment of teachers in addition to public employees. Thisdistinction was apparently added to establish separate bargaining units for administra-
tive teachers, classroom teachers and non-teaching school employees. This separate
categorization is hardly worth the redundancy it produces in what is at best aninartfully drafted statute since the general definition of public employees also includes
teachers. Compare S.B. 340, enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 3319.45-.55 with id.
enacting OHIo REv. CODE H1 4419.01-.11.
[Vol. 5:2
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 5 [1972], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol5/iss2/2
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE STRIKES
is a function of the number and value of employees represented; to
preclude a substantial number of valuable professional employees from
collective bargaining will serve only to destroy the union bargaining
strength already weakened by the retention of the Ferguson Act.
The final bill expected to receive consideration by the General
Assembly is sponsored by Senator Turner. 172 It repeals the Ferguson Act
but, unlike the other bills, does not establish a Public Employee Relations
Board. As a result the public employer plays the dual role of party to
the collective bargaining and enforcer of the Act. The primary oddity
of this bill is that, though it prohibits strikes, throughout it are provisions
which anticipate public employee strikes.
Initially, the bill requires police, firemen, prison guards and all guards
such as university police who enforce rules against other public employees
to protect the safety of persons on the employer's premises, to be included
in a separate bargaining unit. 173 This distinction serves the dual purpose of
maintaining essential services and protecting the employer's property in
the event of a strike by a major public employee union.
Collective bargaining under the bill must commence at least 120 days
before the end of the fiscal year if any item involved will require legislative
appropriation.174 The bill provides the public employer with an instrument
of countervailing pressure by reserving to it the right to maintain the
efficiency of governmental operations. 1m This presumably would allow
the public employer to subcontract any services which may be interrupted
by a strike. The bill further dictates that the collective bargaining
agreement contain no strike and lockout provisions. 176 This would allow
for simple breach of contract actions for any breaches. Subsequent
sections of the bill further implement this mandate by expressly
prohibiting both strikes and lockouts.'7
The parties are given the opportunity to agree on impasse resolution
procedures under the bill, but they are expressly precluded from resorting
to binding arbitration unless they do so under the provisions of the bill.178
If the parties are unable to resolve the impasse, fact finding must be
resorted to. 79 Of course they may also agree upon fact finding as a
resolution procedure. In either event, they may select their own fact
172S.B. 338, 109th Gen. Ass'y, Reg. Sess. § 1 (1971-72), enacting OHIO REV. CODE
§ 4119.01-.13 [hereinafter cited as S.B. 338].
173 S.B. 338, enacting OHIO REV. CODE 1 4119.03.
174 S.B. 338, enacting OHio REV. CODE 14119.05 (D).
175 S.B. 338, enacting OHIO REv. CODE 14119.05(E) (4).
176 S.B. 338, enacting OHIO REv. CODE 14119.06(A).
177 S.B. 338, enacting OHIO REV. CODE 1 4119.08.
178 S.B. 338, enacting OHIO REV. CODE 1 4119.07.
179 Id.
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finder, 18 but in absence of agreement by the parties on a fact finder, one
may be appointed by a judge of the local common pleas court.' 8' The fact
finder is required to hold hearings and make written findings and recom-
mendations for resolution of the dispute available to the parties within
twenty days of his appointment.18 2 The fact finder may, at his option,
make his report publicly available within five days after its submission to
the parties. In any event, the Turner bill requires the report to be made
public fifteen days after its submission to the parties. 183 After fact finding
the parties may submit to voluntary binding arbitration with the provision
that the decisions of the arbitrator which would require legislative
enactment in order to be effective shall be considered advisory only. 8 4
The provision of the bill which prohibits strikes is addressed
specifically to the union as opposed to public employees per se. 18 It
expressly prohibits labor organizations or their agents from engaging
in a strike or from encouraging public employees to engage in a strike.
This phraseology is salutary only to the extent that it does not expressly
designate striking employees as criminals.
When a labor organization calls a strike despite the bill's prohibition,
the public employer then assumes the dual role of party and enforcer. If
the union has not availed itself of the opportunities for mediation or fact
finding in the bill, the public employer may immediately dismiss or
discipline employees who engaged in the strike and suspend the union's
checkoff privileges indefinitely. 8 6 If, on the other hand, the union strikes
after mediation and fact finding, the public employer must first petition
the court of common pleas for a temporary restraining order.8 7 If the
order is not forthcoming within three days or if striking employees refuse
to obey the order, the public employer may then invoke the sanctions
with the qualification of a two-year limit on the checkoff suspension. 88 If
on a hearing for a permanent injunction the court finds that the strike was
the result of the employer's failure to bargain it must order the employer
to take no action against either the striking employees or the union. 89 In
summary, the Turner bill's major shortcoming is its overburdening of the
18o ld.
181 The bill provides that the fact finder may also attempt to mediate or resolve the
dispute. Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 S.B. 338, enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4118.08 (B).
186 S.B. 338, enacting OHIO REV. CODE 1 4119.09.
187 S.B. 338, enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 4119.13 (C).
188 S.B. 338, enacting OHIO REv.CoDE § 4119.13.
189 Id.
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public employer. Few public employers are sufficiently versed in labor
law to be effective bargainers let alone to act as quasi-labor boards.
V. AN UNQUALIFIED RIGHT TO STRIKE
That an absolute prohibition against public employee strikes is
ineffective is a proposition no longer disputed. Hardly a day goes by
without some public employees deciding to withhold their services in an
attempt to underscore the intensity of their position to both the
public employer and the public.190 Imposition of the statutorily provided
sanctions to punish such conduct is recognized to be unfeasible' 91 due to
both the inhibition on collective bargaining which exists when the strike
leaders are in jail, and the impracticality of replacing all the strikers
after discharging them. Tension reduction of the conflict between law
and reality in this area is finally being attempted by a few states. This
attempt is manifested by the legislation discussed earlier which grants
public employees a limited right to strike. 192 While this legislation has
been enacted in only a few states, it certainly appears that a trend toward
a limited right to strike may have commenced. Legislative proposals
currently before the Ohio General Assembly suggest the possibility that
Ohio may follow this trend. The question to be answered is: Is a limited
right to strike the most appropriate response?
Inherent in the usual concept of a limited right to strike is the
countervailing notion that the withdrawal of certain services by public
employees is unthinkable.'93 This notion centers on the premise that the
government is responsible for the health, safety, and welfare of its
constituency. The services which maintain the health, safety, and welfare
of the community are usually termed essential. 94 It is the determination of
190 Not surprisingly, almost half of the public employee strikes that occurred during
1968 emanated from the employees' desire to improve their condition such as through
higher wages. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 11, at 43.
191 Were one to accept John Austin's notion that law is the command of the sovereign,
the antistrike provisions would not even be considered as law because the
sovereign has no intention of inflicting evil on the insubordinate subject. See Austin,
Lectures on Jurisprudence, in SOCIETY, LAW AND MORALITY 400-04 (F. Olafson
ed. 1961).
192 See notes 99-108 supra and accompanying text
193 See, e.g., Bloedorn, The Strike in the Public Sector, in SORRY... No GOVERNMENT
TODAY 250, 256 (R. Walsh ed. 1969).
194 Even the most vociferous proponents of the right to strike tend to agree that
"essential" services may not be discontinued. For example, Theodore Kheel suggests
that when a strike would endanger the safety and health of the community, the
government should be given the power to seek an injunction. This allows for a
cooling-off period similar to that provided for in the Taft-Hartley Act. Kheel, Strikes
and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REv. 931, 941 (1969). The American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO insists upon the right of all
public employees-except for police and other law enforcement officers-to strike.
The charter of every local provides for immediate revocation if members who are
police assist, in any way, in withdrawal of police services. Policy Statement on Public
Employee Unions: Rights and Responsibilities, in SORRY... No GOVERNMENT TODAY
67, 6S-69 (R. Walsh ed. 1969).
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which services are essential that provides the major impediment to this
approach.Y95 Problems arise in the determination because often services
which are deemed essential are being performed by private sector
employees.19 In addition, the essentiality of the particular service may
vary from community to community. Thus, a legislative determination
may be too inflexible to properly accommodate all public employees,
while a deferral to the courts is likely to result in practically an
absolute prohibition. 97
The creation of a State Board which would make the determination
of which services are essential'" appears to overcome these objections,
but it certainly is not a panacea. The employees who are classified as
performing essential services are still prohibited from striking. Alternative
impasse resolution procedures such as compulsory arbitration, 1 9 or fact
finding with binding recommendations, or even Board recommendations
which have taken into account the fact finding recommendations 200 are
not likely to assuage employees who feel the resolution is inequitable. This
will be especially true when a public employer has not completely
bargained in good faith in hope that the arbitrator's or fact finder's award
would be more generous than the employer's true bargaining position
warranted. When these or comparable situations occur, the public
employee must strike.201
Recognition of the inevitability of strikes has led Professor Merton
Bernstein to suggest a substitute for strikes which would alleviate some of
195 Former Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz stated in an address delivered at the
16th International Convention of American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees in April, 1966 the following:
I should like to suggest ... that an attempt to distinguish between various kinds
of governmental functions in terms of their essentiality seem to me fruitless andfutile. Policemen and firemen are ... no more essential than school teachers. The
only difference is that the costs and losses from being without fire and policedepartments is [sic] more dramatice and more immediate, but.., in terms of
measure of the importance to the future.., school children being without
education, even for a week, is a matter of serious concern.
Cited in K. HANSLoW, THE EMERGINo LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT 113 (1967).
196 Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. L.
REv. 943, 950-51 (1969).
197 See notes 105-06 supra and accompanying text. See also Norwalk Teachers Ass'n
v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A. 2d 482 (1951). But see City of Holland
v. Holland Educ. Ass'n 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W. 2d 206 (1968), where the court
required that the public employer come into court with clean hands (had engaged in
good faith bargaining) prior to seeking injunction of a teachers' strike.
198 This idea is found in S.B. 344, enacting OHIO REv. CODE § 4117.14.
199 See, e.g., S.B. 194, enacting Omo REV. CODE § 4119.14(C).
2DDS.B. 344, enacting OHIO REV. CODE 1 4117.14(E).
201From a Freudian perspective, such behavior can certainly not be considered
unnatural. S. FREUD, CIvILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 43 (J. Strachey transl. &
ed. 1961). See also Kheel, supra note 194 at 935.
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the problems strikes pose.202 His substitute is called the non-stoppage
strike, which attempts to force the economic realities of a strike upon the
public employer. In a non-stoppage strike all work continues to be
performed. The employees would give up part of their compensation for
example, 10 per cent initially. The employer, on the other hand, would
be required to pay out the normal compensation plus the amount given
up by the employees. Obviously a surplusage of money immediately
will come into being. The amounts foregone would be placed into a
separate fund and devoted to otherwise unfunded public purposes.
Professor Bernstein notes that while public purposes would be served,
these funds would not enable local government to employ the extra
amounts for ordinary governmental functions. The union would have the
option of increasing the percentage during subsequent weeks if it felt
bargaining was not proceeding satisfactorily. This option is clearly limited
by the amount of compensation the membership is willing to give up.
203
The major thrust of the non-stoppage strike appears to be that it
provides an alternative to the abrupt discontinuance of all services. It is
admittedly geared to the economic aspects of the strike power but it
neglects the political pressures which are created when the community is
deprived of services.204 Thus, while the threat of a non-stoppage strike
attempts to equalize the parties at the bargaining table, it still falls short.
In view of the shortcomings of providing public employees with
a limited right to strike, it appears that the only viable alternative is to
extend an unqualified right to strike to all public employees. The unquali-
fied right would enable all public employees to strike regardless of the
essentiality of the services they provide. Such a suggestion must deal with
the threshold question: Should police and firemen be allowed to strike? If
the unqualified right to strike can be shown to be feasible for police and
firemen, the two categories highest on the essentiality scale, it will be feas-
202 Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARv. L. REv.
459, 469-474 (1971).
203 Id. at 470.
204 Professor Bernstein also develops the concept of a graduated strike as a substitute.
Under this proposal employees could call graduated strikes which would allow for the
withholding of services of one-half day during the first week with the option of
increasing the time during later weeks. This would allow the community to experience
some discomfort on a graduated basis and would avoid the disruption caused by the
total termination of the particular service. However, the concept of essentiality is
incorporated into this proposal. Thus once it is determined that a further reduction
of services would imperil the public health or safety, the employees are prohibited
from increasing their graduated strike. Id. at 474.
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ible throughout the public sector--our case hinges on whether the health,
welfare and safety of the community will be endangered by these strikes. 0 5
Initially it must be pointed out that there is a common fallacy
inherent in virtually all the statutes either proposed or in existence dealing
with public employee relations. This fallacy is the failure to distinguish
between the essentiality of a service and the essentiality of the people who
provide it.206 It has led the drafters of the statutes to prohibit employees
from striking when in essence they really meant to prohibit the discontin-
uance of a service. While a particular service in a community, such as law
enforcement, is essential, the people providing that service are not. And
yet judicial inquiry throughout this area has largely been premised on the
identity of a service to the people who provide it.207 Any inquiry based
upon such a premise inevitably results in a finding that the employees in
question are essential to the community and therefore may not strike. 20 8
Substitutes for public employees do exist. For example, if the police
of one town chose to strike, their duties may be fulfilled by police from
neighboring communities, county and state police, private guards, and
even the National Guard if necessary. Since most strikes may be foreseen
well in advance, it is plausible to place replacement personnel on a standby
alert thereby insuring that essential services will not be interrupted. 209
Although the cost of some substitutes, such as the National Guard, may
be quite high and their availability may vary between localities, this is
a factor in the relative bargaining strength of the parties and nothing
205These criteria, although amorphous, are probably the most specific capable of
statutory codification to measure the essentiality of a governmental service. For
criticism see Note, Recommendations of the Governor's Commission to Revise thePublic Employment Law of Pennsylvania: A Preliminary Assessment, 30 U. PITT. L.
REV. 170 (1968).
206 See, e.g., S.B. 194, enacting OHIO REV. CODE I 4117.14(A).
20 See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Division 268, 41 Ohio Op. 236, 90 N.E. 2d 711
(C.P. 1949).
208See Los Angeles v. Building & Constr. Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P. 2d
305 (1949).
209A classic example of the power of a public employer to assemble reserve
manpower occurred in Chicago during the 1968 Democratic Convention. MayorRichard J. Daley supervised the most massive security arrangements in the history ofAmerican politics: Chicago's twelve thousand policemen had been put on twelve-hour
shifts; five thousand Illinois National Guardsmen had been mobilized and were
standing by near the downtown area; six thousand specially trained army troops wereflown in and were in combat readiness at Glenview Naval Air Station, just north of
the city; several hundred state and county law enforcement officers were on call; andthe largest number of secret service agents ever used at a political convention werein Chicago. Including the private security workers hired for the convention site, a
security force of at least twenty-five thousand was in the city. Mayor Daley
commanded an army larger than that commanded by George Washington. See M.
RoYKo, Boss: RICHARD J. DALEY OF CHICAGO 178 (1971).
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more. In addition, the use of such substitutes by a public employer may
well provide a strike deterrent for future years and for other localities.
210
Another source of countervailing pressure against strikes by police
and firemen inheres in the nature of the work itself. The success of
enforcement and prevention efforts, and in many cases even the safety
of the men lies in the cooperation and goodwill of the community.
21
'
Those public employees who strike for excessive wages or petty grievances
will soon encounter widespread approbation.2 2 Through the publication
of fact finding reports the public may be appraised of the merits of
a dispute and as wages in the public sector approach those in the private
sector the latitude for strikes will narrow.
2 13
A primary benefit of the unqualified right to strike will be the
synthesis of law with reality for strikes by police, firemen and other such
"essential" employees do occur and will continue to do so either overtly
or covertly.214 To label one man a criminal for attempting to benefit his
economic status in a manner readily available to his peers is wholly
inconsistent with the basic philosophy of capitalism. If the valuable theory
of allocating wages to services through collective bargaining and controlled
economic competition is to be successfully engrafted from the private to
the public employment sector, it cannot be diffused into sterile formalities.
210 In any event the mere threat of the use of a substantial strike breaking force
would materially strengthen the public employers bargaining position.
211 See J. TOWLER, THE POLICE ROLE IN RACIAL CONFLICTS (1964).
212 Some commentators have postulated that the pressure of rising taxes may put the
public in such a recalcitrant mood that it may be willing to endure the loss of even
essential services. See Burton & Kreider, The Role and Consequence of Strikes by
Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418, 427 (1970).
213 The use of a locally prominent fact finding committee appears to be a very
effective way of making such information available to the public. See note 157 supra
and accompanying text.
214 An overt strike is a publicized formally announced walkout while a covert strike
occurs when public employees absent themselves for legal excuses which are usually
false. An example of a covert strike is what is popularly termed the "blue flu." It
occurs when police engage in a work stoppage by calling in sick where they cannot
legally strike. See Rains, New York Public Relations Laws, 20 LAB. L.J. 264 (1969).
For an account of a recent sick call strike by firemen in Ashtabula, Ohio see The
Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio) Nov. 29, 1971 § A, at 8, col. 1.
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